Last week, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) elected a new judge to the European Court of Human Rights. Mr Gilberto Felici was elected as the new judge in respect of San Marino. His term shall start in September of this year and he will succeed current judge Kristina Pardalos. Mr Felici is currently both a judge and a lecturer. He is very familiar with another branch of the Council of Europe's work, as he was also a member of ECRI (the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance) since 2003.
Wednesday, 6 June 2018
I am very happy to announce that my new article, co-authored with my good colleague and friend dr Michael Hamilton (University of East Anglia) has just been published in the Human Rights Law Review (Vol. 18, Issue 2, 2018, pp. 205-232). The article is entitled 'Human Rights Courts as Norm-Brokers'. This is the abstract:
'This article develops an understanding of human rights courts as ‘norm-brokers’. We regard ‘norm-brokering’ as an exegetic method of judicial reasoning, ultimately concerned with reason-giving and the quality of justification. It entails robust engagement with alternative norms raised in the course of human rights adjudication. Norm-brokering thus involves much more than the mere cataloguing of alternative norms—and, at a minimum, a methodical approach to the question of normative harmonization. We suggest that the process of norm-brokering contributes to ‘public reason’ by enhancing the intelligibility of judgments. This, in turn, helps confound legitimacy-based critiques of human rights courts. The argument is supported by an analysis of 10 years’ worth of European Court of Human Rights judgments, focusing on the ways in which norms from the Inter-American human rights system are relied upon (or not) by the Strasbourg Court.'
Tuesday, 5 June 2018
The University of Bologna, King’s College London and the University of Strasbourg are co-organising a summer school “The Protection of Fundamental Rights in Europe” (Bertinoro, 24-29 June 2018). This 18th edition, is hosted in the Castle of Bertinoro (see photo), and it involves around 30 hours of lectures on the topic of the protection of fundamental rights in both the EU and ECHR systems. According to the organisers:
'The Summer School aims to provide graduates, practictioners and young researchers (Ph.D. candidates) with an in depth background of the protection of fundamental rights at European level. The general courses are about the European Convention on Human Rights, and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. The single lectures tackle topics alike asylum and migration, national identites and EU law, relationship between the CJEU and the ECHR, EU external action, the margin of appreciation doctrine, commercial law and fundamental rights.
Thanks to the support of the Fondazione Cassa dei Risparmi di Forli, selected participants are fees-waived and complimentary half-board accommodation for 5 nights is included.'
Further information and the call for application can be found here.
Saturday, 26 May 2018
Today, exactly ten years ago, on 26 of May 2008, I started the ECHR Blog. The idea for the blog had come up in conversations with a few friends and colleagues, in which we noted that there was a gap in the, at the time, still newly emerging blogosphere. There were blogs on international law, on European law, on human rights, but none on the ECHR specifically. And thus I embarked that day on an endeavor of which I had no clue that I would still be at it a decade later. In the initial post, I expressed the hope that the blog could be a "portal to information on the European Court of Human Right and its judgments and decisions."
I started to post on case-law, on new publications, political developments and academic events, all related to the European Convention on Human Rights and its Court. And after a few months, I heard - to my slight apprehension, to be honest - that not just fellow academics, but even some judges at the Court itself were reading the posts. Over these ten years, I have posted 956 posts (counting the current one) and the blog has attracted over 2.2 million pageviews from across the globe, including from states where human rights information is not always readily accessible or even simply blocked.
These ten years of keeping up and developing the blog would not have been possible without the help of countless people. First off, the pioneer legal bloggers that inspired me, the other law-related blogs that helped me link up to a wider community, the guest bloggers who were willing to share their insights on Strasbourg developments, and the many, many readers who fed this blog with news, publications, event announcements and much more. It is a truism, but without my readers, I would not have been able to keep this up. A big thank you to all of you - your exhortations, kind messages, information and simply interest and visits to the blog, have helped to keep it going. For, I can reveal, that there is no army of academic slaves working invisibly to run the blog (as several people asked over the years) - I have always been doing the postings myself. From the days of being a beginning lecturer up to my current position, this has of course become increasingly challenging, because of many other obligations - and as some avid readers must have noticed the frequency has decreased over the years, keeping pace with an increasingly demanding job. But it is still a joy to do and it has intensely enriched my academic life in many ways, making new friends along the road!
Please keep sending me your ECHR-related information and feel free to reach out to me with your remarks on the blog. Your input is the vital lifeline of the ECHR Blog!
Wednesday, 16 May 2018
It is my pleasure to introduce a guest commentary by my Utrecht University colleague dr Bas van Bockel. He has written a commentary on the interesting recent inadmissibility decision in Krombach v France, that relates to the ne bis in idem principle of Article 4 of Protocol 7 ECHR and to the Strasbourg-Luxembourg relation.
Krombach Returns to Strasbourg
Bas van Bockel, Utrecht University
After the death of 15-year-old Kalinka Bamberski in Germany in 1982, a criminal investigation was launched with the plaintiff dr. Krombach, the girl’s stepfather, as the suspect. The investigation and in particular the handling of the forensic aspects was botched, and the public prosecutor discontinued the prosecution of Krombach for lack of evidence. Convinced that his daughter was sexually abused and killed by her stepfather, Kalinka’s father mr. Bamberski attempted to have the decision by the German authorities ending the prosecution reversed. When this failed, he adhered the French authorities because of the victim’s French nationality. Krombach was tried and sentenced to 15 years imprinsonment in absentia by the Paris Court of Assizes. Krombach did not appear in court in France for fear of being arrested and his trial was conducted under the French “contempt procedure” (jugement par contumace) under which an absent subject is legally prevented from defending him- or herself. This led to an earlier judgment before the ECtHR matter (ECHR 13 February 2001, no. 29731/96), in which the ECtHR ruled in Krombach’s found an infringement of both the right to a fair trial (art. 6 ECHR) and the right to an appeal (art. 2 Protocol 7 ECHR).
This did not alter the fact that Krombach was still wanted in France, whilst he was living freely in Germany. Bamberski attempted in vain for Krombach to be surrendered to the French authorities. In the end, he resolved to make arrangements for him to be kidnapped and taken to France by force. In 2009 Krombach was found bound gagged and wounded in the streets of a French city near the German border after the police were alerted to his presence by an anonymous caller. He was arrested, (re-)tried and sentenced again by a French court, this time for for causing bodily harm resulting in the death of Kalinka Bamberski. In the procedure before the ECtHR that would follow, Krombach complained that his conviction violated the ne bis in idem principle of art. 4 Protocol no. 7 to the ECHR, in view of the fact that his previous prosecution in Germany (and not his earlier conviction in absentia in France) was finally discontinued for lack of evidence.
The Court held the application to be admissible because the ne bis in idem principle of Article 4 of Protocol 7 ECHR only applies to situations within one and the same state party. Although France and Germany are both EU Member States and a broader, “transnational” ne bis in idem rule in the form of Article 54 of the Convention on the Implementation of the Schengen Agreement is in force within the EU, this provision has no bearing on the scope of application of Article 4 of Protocol 7 ECHR. The Court finds that it lacks competence to apply rules contained in EU law or to rule on a possible breach of those rules, except where a breach of a rule of EU law incidentally also breaches a right from the Convention. It is therefore up to the member states and in particular the national judiciary to interpret and apply national law in the light of the applicable provisions of Union law, and the Court is not in a position to rule on a potential breach of EU law. The application is declared inadmissible. In itself the decision does not come as a surprise given the wording of Article 4 of Protocol 7 ECHR. Although the question of the international (non-)application of that provision was debated around the time that the 7th Protocol was drafted and adopted (1984), that debate has now been put to rest because the wording of the provision excludes the possibility of international application of the ne bis in idem provision contained in it.
The decision raises interest because of what the Court says about its own role in relation to European Union law. In the decision, the Court sets out a seemingly straightforward division of tasks under which the national judiciary interprets and applies national law in the light of any relevant EU law. According to it, the ECtHR “merely” establishes the compatibility of the result with ECHR law, without prejudice to any national or EU arrangement in the field of human rights. This could be interpreted as further clarifying where the line between EU and ECHR law is drawn as far as the Court is concerned, while at the same time making it clear that the Court does not intend to overstep that line by applying Convention standards (directly) to EU law.
No doubt, this part of the Court’s decision will be interpreted as a reaction to the position taken by the CJEU in Opinion 2/13 (CJEU 18 December 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454) on the compatibility of the draft accession agreement of the EU to the ECHR. In that Opinion, which has been widely criticised (see, amongst others, here, here, and here), the CJEU essentially held that accession to the ECHR could threaten the autonomy of EU law. The Grand Chamber reacted to Opinion 2/13 in Avotiņš v. Latvia (ECtHR 23 May 2016, nr. 17502/07, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2018:0220DEC006752114), in which it confirmed that the so-called “Bosphorus presumption”, named after the 2005 judgment in Bosphorus Hava Yolları Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v. Ireland, still stands firmly, although by no means unconditionally.
The interesting thing about Krombach II is that the question raised in it is not one along the usual lines (of whether any part of EU law is capable of violating ECHR standards), but rather a question of whether a fundamental right from EU law (i.e. Article 54 CISA) is capable of determining the scope and interpretation of a Convention right. It is therefore interesting to note that this appears to raise some of the same sensitivities. One possible reason for this could be that if the Court were to interpret Convention rights like Article 4 of Protocol 7 ECHR in accordance with provisions from EU law like Article 54 CISA in situations in which EU member states are involved, this would effectively allow the Court to rule on (parts of) EU law indirectly, though the interpretation and application of Convention rights. Whether the CJEU was actually concerned about such a “backdoor issue” or not, the Court’s decision in Krombach II makes it very clear that this will not happen. In doing so, the Court also makes it clear that it intends to conduct itself in the most diplomatic and respectful way possible vis-à-vis the Luxemburg court, in the very sensitive area between the Convention and EU law.
Friday, 11 May 2018
Fiona de Londras (University of Birmingham) and Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou (University of Liverpool) have written a new book entitled Great Debates on the European Convention on Human Rights. The book was published with Macmillan Publishers and was written for higher education teaching. This is the summary:
'This engaging textbook provides a critical analysis of the legitimacy and effectiveness of the European Convention on Human Rights and its practical operation. In a succinct way, the book investigates questions around the legitimacy of how the European Court of Human Rights develops its law, the obligations of states to comply with its judgments, the adequacy of the Convention in securing basic goods, and the effectiveness of the system in protecting rights ‘in the real world’. It assesses some under-explored areas of the Convention that are often overlooked. Presenting a number of debates about the legitimacy and effectiveness of the system in a provocative and critical style, this book encourages debate, discussion, and self-reflection on how, when and why the Convention protects human rights in Europe.
An ideal text for Law students at English and Welsh universities and higher education institutions taking a module in The European Convention on Human Rights (LLB or LLM level), and for GDL/CPE students and those taking the postgraduate LPC training course.'
Tuesday, 1 May 2018
The Court has put a new case-law guide online on its website. The new guide deals with Article 18 ECHR which concerns limitation on the use of restrictions on rights. The article provides:
“The restrictions permitted under [the] Convention to the said rights and freedoms shall not be applied for any purpose other than those for which they have been prescribed.”
It has become topical in a number of cases of the past few years, after having been "dormant" for much of its existence. Since the article deals with the "misapplication" of power by state authorities( according to the Convention's travaux préparatoires), it could be seen as a litmus test for deep rule of law problems. Thus, the increased jurisprudential attention to this provision is telling in itself. See, for example, the Grand Chamber judgment in Merabishvili v Georgia of November 2017 in which the Court found a violation of Article 18.
The Case-law Guides series reflect the Court’s major judgments, organised by Convention article. The reviews of the case-law are regularly updated and translated into other languages.
Wednesday, 25 April 2018
Yesterday, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe elected the new judge in respect of Montenegro at the European Court of Human Rights. With a large majority (101 of 160 votes cast), Ms Ivana Jelić was elected. She will succeed her predecessor Nebojša Vučinić within three months.
The new judge comes from academia and was until now associate professor of the Faculty of Law and Faculty of Political Science of the University of Montenegro. She has wide experience in the international human rights system, most notably as a member (since 2015) and Vice President (since 2017) of the United Nations Human Rights Committee, which supervises the ICCPR. From the perspective of coherence of international human rights law, this election may therefore offer opportunities. I wish her all the best in her new position!
Thursday, 19 April 2018
Now that the final Copenhagen Declaration has been published, it is my pleasure to publish a guest post by the editors of the earlier commentary series of the draft Declaration, Janneke Gerards and Sarah Lambrecht:
The Final Copenhagen Declaration: Fundamentally Improved With a Few Remaining Caveats
By Janneke Gerards (professor of fundamental rights law, Utrecht University) and Sarah Lambrecht (researcher, Research Group Government and Law, UAntwerp and law clerk at the Belgian Constitutional Court)
At the High Level Conference meeting in Copenhagen on 12 and 13 April 2018 under the Danish Chairmanship of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, the Copenhagen Declaration was adopted. This Declaration was much anticipated, as the draft version issued on 5 February 2018 by the Danish Government was heavily criticised. Academics (on EJIL:Talk!, Strasbourg Observers and ECHR Blog, UK Strasbourg Spotlight and Verfassungsblog), NGOs (see also the Director of ICJ, the Executive Director of Open Society Justice Initiative and the Danish Helsinki-Committee of Human Rights), national human rights institutions, members of national parliaments in PACE and civil servants expressed grave concern about the harm the draft Copenhagen Declaration could do to the Court’s independence and authority, about its misconstruction of the Court’s jurisdiction and role (especially when defining the Convention system’s subsidiary nature), its potential to undermine the universality of human rights, and its objective of installing new channels of ‘dialogue’, which could have the effect of exposing the Court to undue political pressure by national governments. Overall, most commentators agreed that the initial draft, if adopted as such, would damage the Convention’s system of protection of human rights in Europe as a whole.
It has now turned out that much of this criticism was shared by a large number of States. Prior to its adoption, intense negotiations and redrafting took place in the Drafting Group on the draft Copenhagen Declaration. The States critical of the initial draft succeeded in fundamentally improving it, deleting or watering down the most criticised features of the initial draft and changing its overall tone. In fact, a text comparison makes clear that the Declaration has been almost entirely rewritten. It appears that the Danish Government’s fundamental criticism and its reform agenda were not received with much enthusiasm across Europe. On the contrary, the States Parties visibly have chosen not to endorse this reform agenda. Illustrative is the insistence of the Luxembourg Minister of Justice that the adopted Copenhagen Declaration would not receive the support of Luxembourg if it could be read or even perceived as a limit that politicians would like to impose on the power and authority of the Court.
The Prism of Subsidiarity
One of the most striking differences between the initial draft and the final version of the Declaration concerns the notion of subsidiarity. The initial draft viewed the Court’s role exclusively through the prism of subsidiarity. This in fact was a skewed prism, as one of the authors demonstrated in this comment series: the draft did not realistically reflect the foundations of the Convention system, the meaning of the notion of subsidiarity and the actual use of the margin of appreciation doctrine by the Court. This misapprehension also extended to the Courts’ more recently developed process-based approach, which is closely related to these long-established doctrines.
In rewriting the initial draft, references in the initial draft to the principle of subsidiarity and the margin of appreciation have been removed (paras. 4, 8, 9, 12, 22, 26 and 29 of the initial draft) or reworded (paras. 5, 10, 13, 14, 17, 23, 24, 25, 27 and 28 of the initial draft) in the final Copenhagen Declaration (paras. 4, 7, 8, 10, 13, 28 and 31). The end result constitutes a complete overhaul. Instead of instructing the Court on how it should apply the margin of appreciation and when it should avoid intervening, the final Declaration reiterates the Court’s jurisprudence on the principle of subsidiarity and the margin of appreciation (para. 28). Controversial paragraphs on how the Court should approach asylum and immigration cases have been deleted (paras. 25 and 26). The final Declaration also no longer ‘welcomes and encourages that subsidiarity is increasingly playing an influential role in the Court’s case law and as an organising principle for the Convention system’ (para. 12 of the initial draft). Rather, it ‘reiterates that strengthening the principle of subsidiarity is not intended to limit or weaken human rights protection, but to underline the responsibility of national authorities to guarantee the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention’ (para. 10 of the Copenhagen Declaration).
The resulting paragraphs mainly reflect the European consensus on subsidiarity that is already expressed in earlier declarations. However, the upshot is that it does do little more than this. In a time where we are witnessing a clear regression of the rule of law and of the effective enforceability of human rights in an increasing number of States Parties, the Copenhagen Declaration missed an important opportunity to give a strong signal to the States. These national developments have been reduced to a problem of national implementation of the Convention (see e.g. para. 12) and of execution of the Court’s judgments (see e.g. para. 20) and to a caseload challenge for the Court (see e.g. para. 45). In addition, although the onus is now more clearly on the States to implement the Court’s judgments, as Ed Bates has suggested, it can only be ‘hoped that the States will now put their full energy, effort and attention into backing the Convention system going forward’.
The Need for Dialogue and the Risk of Undue Political Pressure
Another much criticised aspect of the draft Declaration was the way it gave shape to the need for dialogue between the States Parties and the Court. The draft proposed that: (1) States Parties should be able to indicate their support for the referral of a Chamber case to the Grand Chamber (paras. 35 and 38), (2) States Parties should increase their third party interventions, especially in important and principled cases before the Grand Chamber (paras. 34 and 39-40), (3) States Parties should discuss the general development of areas of the Court’s case law of particular interest to them and, if appropriate, adopt texts expressing their general views (paras. 32-33 and 41), (4) States Parties should hold a series of informal meetings to discuss relevant developments in the jurisprudence of the Court (para. 42).
By doing so, the draft text went far beyond the conventional mechanisms for dialogue and in fact aimed to ‘rebalance’ the power between (the executive branch of) the States Parties and the European Court of Human Rights, as was detailed by one of the authors in this comment series as well as by the Court itself in its opinion on the draft Copenhagen Declaration (paras. 15-16). When contemplating new ways for national governments to interact with the Court, States Parties have to be very careful about the potential repercussions on the Court’s independence. In no way should such proposals be a pretext for institutionalising ways for national governments to exert undue political pressure on the Court.
For this reason, it is good news that the most controversial new way for national governments to interact with the Court has been deleted. The final Declaration no longer ‘encourages States Parties to discuss the general development of areas of the Court’s case law of particular interest to them and, if appropriate, adopt texts expressing their general views’ (para. 41 of the initial draft). Also, there will no longer be ‘a series of informal meetings of States Parties before the end of 2019’ to discuss ‘relevant developments in the jurisprudence of the Court’ organised and hosted by the Danish Chairmanship (para. 42 of the initial draft). Instead, the Danish Chairmanship will ‘organise and host, before the end of 2018, an informal meeting of the States Parties and other stakeholders, as a follow up to the 2017 High-Level Expert Conference in Kokkedal, where general developments in the jurisprudence of the Court can be discussed, with respect for the independence of the Court and the binding character of its judgments’ (para. 41).
At the same time, some problematic proposals have been retained. The final Declaration still invites ‘the Court to adapt its procedures to make it possible for other States Parties to indicate their support for the referral of a Chamber case to the Grand Chamber when relevant’ (para. 38; para. 38 of the initial draft). As noted previously, one can question whether it is appropriate to ‘invite’ the Court to alter its own procedures, especially when the Court has not given its clear support to this. Moreover, the proposal was not amended to ensure that other stakeholders were given the same privilege to allow for a balanced mechanism, as was also suggested previously. A way to achieve this could be through opening up this mechanism by allowing ‘any person concerned who is not the applicant’ (cf. Article 36 (2) ECHR) to indicate their support for referral of a Chamber case to the Grand Chamber, as proposed by Lize Glas in this comment series. Once such support has been issued by a State Party or a person concerned, any State Party or any person concerned should also be able to indicate why a judgment should not be referred.
On a more positive note, just like the draft, the final Declaration underlines that the execution of judgments is a key obligation. Also, it encourages involvement of civil society in the dialogue on the implementation of the Convention. The value of this has been clearly explained in Antoine Buyse’s contribution to our comment series. In addition, the Declaration encourages both ‘the Court to support increased third-party interventions’ (para. 39) and the States Parties to ‘[build] the necessary capacity [to increase coordination and co-operation on third-party interventions] and [communicate] more systematically through the Government Agents Network on cases of potential interest for other States Parties’ (para. 40). The Copenhagen Declaration can thus be used as a foundation to further highlight the proper ways for States to engage in a dialogue with the Court via third party interventions, and invigorate this underused possibility.
The Court’s Resources
Perhaps the most important practical addition to the draft version is the express acknowledgement in the final Declaration of ‘the importance of retaining a sufficient budget for the Court, as well as the Department for the Execution of Judgments, to solve present and future challenges’ (para. 52) and the call made upon the States Parties to ‘consider making voluntary contributions to the Human Rights Trust Fund and to the Court’s special account’ (para. 53). Compared to the draft version, these invitations are both broader (the draft version only referred to the Court, not to the Execution Department, see para. 52) and more specific. Indeed, especially now that the Russian Government has withdrawn its financial contribution to the Council of Europe, lack of budget is one of the greatest threats to the continuing effectiveness of the Convention system. It is therefore certainly to be welcomed that this concern is now addressed. At the same time, the text of paras. 52 and 53 is very vague and weak. There are no guarantees that the Court’s and the Execution Department’s budgetary worries are over, especially considering that extra contributions only need to be made on a voluntary basis.
The Outlook for the Future?
Overall, thus, it is obvious that the text of the final Copenhagen Declaration is very different from the draft version and it is far less problematic from the perspective of European protection of fundamental rights. There is great political value in this. To many States, the Copenhagen High Level Conference offered considerable opportunity to reaffirm their adherence to the Convention system and its underlying principles. Perhaps even more importantly, it showed that the Danish efforts to tone down the importance of the Convention system have backfired. If anything, the final Declaration exposes that the criticism of governments such as the Danish is not widely shared.
At the same time, at many points, the Declaration is still problematic or weak, and from a practical perspective, we could easily have done without the Declaration. Indeed, in our first blogpost in the series on the draft Declaration, we already explained that organising High Level Conferences seems to have grown into something like a ritual. These conferences always appear to result in declarations containing a cocktail of more or less the same ingredients. These declarations have had considerable impact in the beginning, but due to the lack of new ideas and ingredients, this is increasingly less so. The final Copenhagen Declaration seems to prove the truth of this analysis. All topics addressed in the Declaration can be found in earlier High Level Declarations and action plans, often even in more or less the same wording, and no really new or exciting solutions and ideas have been presented. Indeed, it makes clear that, if the aim really is to safeguard the long-term effectiveness of the ECHR system, it would have been more useful to invest the available time, energy, resources and political capital in actually implementing all action plans and recommendations previously adopted. It is just to be hoped that this will be the course pursued in the coming years.
Please note that the views expressed by Sarah Lambrecht here are personal to the author. This commentary was published earlier on Strasbourg Observers.
Wednesday, 18 April 2018
The European Implementation Network is organising a training seminar in Strasbourg on 21-22 June on implementation of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights. The training course is specifically geared towards civil society organisations. The participation costs of those accepted will be borne by EIN. This is the information of the organisers:
'CSOs are accorded a critical role in the Council of Europe’s (CoE) process that underpins the supervision by the Committee of Ministers (CM) of the implementation of these judgments (known as the CM judgment execution process). This is made possible under Rule 9.2. of the Rules of the CM. However, there is little readily accessible information on how this process works and how CSOs can engage with it to best effect, with the result that this powerful mechanism for implementing human rights is very underutilised.
The aims of the seminar are to equip CSOs to use the CM judgment execution process to support full and effective implementation of ECtHR judgments; and to share best practice on advocating for implementation at the national level.
The seminar will cover the following issues:
- The CM execution process and the role of NGOs.
- How to use Rule 9.2 submissions to push for effective implementation at national level: case studies.
- Rule 9.2 submissions: group exercises on developing general measures and/or responses to non-implementation. The session is aimed at helping participants who have not engaged with the CM judgment execution process to do so – gaining advice from other participants.
- Advocacy: EIN and Strasbourg-based advocacy, advocating for improved implementation structures at the national level.
The seminar will combine:
- presentations by experts on how to engage effectively with the CM judgment execution process;
- sharing of learning by participants who have already engaged with implementation, whether through the CM judgment execution process, or at the domestic level;
- group exercises to help participants starting work on a new case to develop the content and recommendations they should include in their written submissions to the CM (i.e., Rule 9.2 submissions).
Staff of civil society organisations working on, or planning to work on, implementation of ECtHR judgments; independent lawyers supporting civil society organisations in these activities.
Criteria for selection of participants:
Participants will be selected on the basis of following criteria:
The impact resulting from full and effective implementation of any cases their organisation is supporting.
Any relevant experience the participant is able to share. The training methodology requires a number of participants with particular attributes – some with experience in different aspects of implementation, others with cases which will be particularly suitable for group exercises.
Participants will be limited to one per CSO and are required to have a good working knowledge of English. They must be present for the full duration of the seminar.
Please note that EIN will be conducting further training seminars on an ongoing basis. Applicants not selected will be able to apply for a later seminar. CSOs that are supporting cases currently before the ECtHR should also consider applying for future EIN training seminars as and when their cases are settled.
Travel and accommodation expenses:
EIN will cover the costs of participants’ travel, accommodation, food and visas. Guidelines on the funding procedure will be provided to selected participants.
Please complete the application form and return to Agnes Ciccarone (aciccarone at einnetwork.org) by 26 April 2018. Please also arrange for your organisation to send a letter supporting your application, confirming that you have a good working knowledge of English and can be present for the full duration of the seminar.
The results of the application review will be made know by mid-May.'